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Abstract
Section 2 of the the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution
gives congress the power to reapportion congressional representation when
the right to vote in a state is abridged for any reason “except for partic-
ipation in rebellion, or other crime”. Historically, however, all serious
attempts to implement Section 2 have failed because of the the difficulty
of quantifying the degree of voting rights abridgment given the available
data. This article describes a computer model which quantifies voting
rights abridgment for the states using only input information which was
publicly available prior to the 1958 congressional election. The probable
changes in the make-up of the 86th congress and possible impact on civil
rights legislation at the time are also addressed. While it does seem that
there was enough information available to model voter rights infringement,
and thus to implement Section 2, it is questionable whether the ultimate
impact on civil rights reform would have been material.
Keywords: fourteenth amendment, apportionment, simulation, nonlinear
programming, civil rights, civil rights act
Introduction
One morning in late September, 1957, Victor Sharrow was eager to see President
Eisenhower. He had arrived without an appointment at the President’s summer
house in Newport, Rhode Island carrying an armload of books and carefully
compiled tables. His self-appointed mission was to bring an important matter
to Eisenhower’s attention: according to Sharrow’s analysis, the Democrats were
headed for another congressional victory in 1958. Fortunately, he had a solution
which would allow the Republican president to avoid a divided government [18,
pp. 89-90]. He urged that Republican congressmen must immediately push to
enforce Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution (14/2),
which reads,
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Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when
the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for Pres-
ident and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the mem-
bers of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhab-
itants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.
A widely read study by the Southern Regional Council, reported in the
July 15, 1957 issue of Newsweek magazine, had concluded that very few eligible
black voters in the South had actually voted in the previous election, presum-
ably because their voting rights were being systematically abridged.[27] Under
14/2, this meant that Congress had the power to reapportion and take away
House seats and presidential electors from these states. In those days the “Solid
South” still voted overwhelmingly Democrat. In the 1956 election, 56 South-
ern Democratic members of Congress had run unopposed [16]. Victor Sharrow
was a lukewarm Republican but a nearly fanatical supporter of the civil rights
movement. He believed that enforcement of 14/2 would weaken the Southern
voting block while giving more representation to progressive states like his own
New York, finally allowing real progress in civil rights legislation. Alternately,
Southern states could keep their seats in the house, but only if they disman-
tled the system of ”Jim Crow” voting laws designed to keep black citizens from
voting.
Victor Sharrow never got a chance to talk to Eisenhower. He was forced to
leave his materials with a secret service agent. The closest he was allowed to
come to the president was a quick glimpse of him across the golf course. Sharrow
never knew whether his materials had been passed on [18, p. 90]. Even if they
were, Eisenhower had more pressing matters to think about that September than
an obscure clause in a century old constitutional amendment; throughout his
“vacation” in Rhode Island, he had been trying to manage a rapidly escalating
crises in Little Rock, in which Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus had deployed
national guardsmen to openly defy school integration. Discussing a plan to
enforce 14/2, and increase tensions with Southerners, would have been the last
thing to interest Eisenhower at that point [1, pp. 413-423].
Victor Sharrow had no better luck with Vice President Richard Nixon, nor
with the dozens of other politicians, journalists, and non-profit leaders that
he contacted [18, pp. 89-138]. The Democratic party retained a comfortable
majority in the 1958 election, yet Sharrow was undeterred. A union electrician
who had put himself through law school at NYU, he had written his senior law
note on the Fourteenth Amendment [19]. 14/2 became his lifelong obsession.
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Denied entry to the New York Bar in 1951 for alleged “pinko” sympathies, he
continued to work as an electrical contractor while spending most of his free
time and money on a private campaign to enforce 14/2, self publishing a book
on the subject in 1960 [10].
The Fourteenth Amendment had originally been intended to curb the po-
litical power of Southern representatives returning to congress after the Civil
War. Section 2, allowing reapportionment of states that abridged voting rights,
came over time to be regarded as nothing more than an “historical curiosity”.[8,
p. 2201]
Beginning around 1960, Sharrow instigated a series of at least fifteen court
cases related to 14/2 [20]. While he was neither the first nor the only person to
seek a judicial remedy, he was certainly the most persistent. Legal scholars Mark
Killenbeck and Steve Sheppard have refer to him as the “section 2 warrior” [12].
Sharrow’s court actions universally failed. Judges found various arguments to
avoid ruling on apportionment, which they saw as a strictly political question.
One of their more common arguments, cited in the decisions for such cases as
Sharrow v Brown and Lampkin v Conner, was that the task of collecting enough
information to show the amount of abridgment of voting rights in states and cal-
culating the resulting change in apportionment were “Herculean” tasks, beyond
the immediate ability of any of the parties in the cases [21][15]. Thus, in the eyes
of the court, Sharrow and the other plaintiffs were incapable of describing the
specific remedy they were seeking, and the cases were not justiciable. In fact the
first congressional attempt to implement 14/2, in 1868, had been unsuccessful
for exactly this reason. The task of gathering and analyzing data indicating
all the reasons a citizen’s voting might be restricted in each state was judged
beyond the abilities of the 9th Census. The expedient Congress chose instead,
simply adding a column to the census questionnaire for “citizens of the United
States, being twenty-one years of age, whose right to vote is denied or abridged
on other grounds than rebellion or crime”, was too simplistic, required too much
thinking on the part of respondents, and generated nonsense data which had to
be discarded [27].
Was the task still impossible in the 1950’s and 1960’s? Based on information
which was publicly available in 1957, would it have been possible to quantita-
tively estimate the extent of voting rights abridgment on a state-by-state basis?
If so, and assuming that congressional representation was reapportioned per
Section 2 of the Fourteenth amendment, how might this change the results of
the 1958 congressional election?
Methodology
A four step process was used to model the amount of voting rights abridgment
in each state in the 1956 presidential election, which would have been the most
recent national election prior to the 1958 congressional election. All input data
was taken directly from US Government publications from the period. The first
step was to calculate the percentage of eligible voters (citizens over 21 whose
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rights had not been abridged for “rebellion or other crime”) who had actually
voted in each state in 1956. The second step was to calculate a rough estimate
of the degree of voter freedom in each state. In the third step, using only states
which appeared to have a negligible degree of voting rights infringement, na-
tional average voter turnout rates were estimated for white, black, and other
non-white voters. In the final step, the above data was used to create a simu-
lation model to refine the estimates of voting freedom for each racial group in
each state.
Based on the output of this model, and assuming that Section 2 of the
14th Amendment was applied literally, the resulting change in congressional
apportionment was then calculated. Another simulation model was then used
to explore the probable changes in party control of the House of Representatives
after this revised apportionment.
Calculation of Actual Voter Turnout in 1956
Estimated populations of each state in 1956 are available from the US Census
Bureau [3]. The bureau estimates populations in intercensal years by extrap-
olating from the most recent census. Numbers of citizens 21 and over and
break-downs of state populations by racial category (white, black, and other
non-white) are also available [22]. Voting statistics for federal elections are main-
tained by the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives[16]. Using this
data, the total percentage voter turnout for citizens age 21 and over for each
state can be approximated by equation 1.
Ti =
(V56,i)(E50,i)
(e50,i)(E56,i)
(1)
Where:
Ti = total voter turnout in state i
V56,i = total votes cast in state i in 1956
E50,i = total population in state i in 1950
e50,i = total non-incarcerated population 21 or older in state i in 1950
E56,i = total population in state i in 1956
This data is summarized in table 1.
Initial Estimate of Voting Freedom Rates by State
The turnout, Ti is a function of the percentage of voters who are free to vote
(U ), the percentage of voters in each of racial category (P) and the natural
turnout rate (T ) for each racial group (i.e. the percentage of eligible citizens
from that group who would vote if there were no restrictions). (eq 2).
Ti = Uw,iPw,iTw,i + Ub,iPb,iTb,i + Uo,iPo,iTo,i (2)
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Where:
Uw,i = voting freedom rate of whites in state i
Pw,i = fraction of state i’s total population that is white
Tw,i = natural turnout rate for whites in state i
Ub,i = voting freedom rate of blacks in state i
Pb,i = fraction of state i’s total population that is black
Tb,i = natural turnout rate for blacks in state i
Uo,i = voting freedom rate of other non-whites in state i
Po,i = fraction of state i’s total population that is other non-white
To,i = natural turnout rate for other non-whites in state i
In order to estimate the U terms, assume that the natural turnout for each
racial group in each state is equal to the mean turnout for the entire nation
in 1956, 58.181%. First approximations for the (U) terms are then found by
minimizing equation 3 for each state:
Minimize:
0.58181(Uw,iPw,i + Ub,iPb,i + Uo,iPo,i)− Ti (3)
For decision variables:
Uw,i, Ub,i, Uo,i
Subject to:
Uw,i, Ub,i, Uo,i ∈ [0, 1]
Uw,i ≥ Ub,i
Uw,i ≥ Uo,i
The later two constraints are based on the assumption that white voters
in 1956 were always more free from voting restrictions than non-white voters.
Finding the minimum yields an approximate solution even if the system does
not have an exact, unique solution in the interval [0,1].
The overall voting freedom rate, U¯ , is the average of the U terms weighted
by the population percentages. Based on the approximate U terms, 25 states
had a U¯ of 100%, indicating that there was little or no voting abridgment in
these states.
Calculation of Natural Voting Turnout Rates by Racial
Group
The average turnout for each group was calculated by averaging 10,000 runs in
which a bootstrap sample of 25 states was created by drawing with replacement
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from the set of 25 states with negligible voting rights abridgement, then finding
turnout rates that minimized equation 4. The bootstrap method was used to
mitigate adverse effects of the small sample size.
Minimize:
25∑
j=1
(Tw,jPw,i + Tb,jPb,j + To,jPo,j − Tj)2 (4)
For decision variables:
Tw,j , Tb,j , To,j : j ∈ {i | U¯i = 0}
Subject to:
Tw,j , Tb,j , To,j ∈ [0, 1]
Interestingly, this model seems to indicate that, even without voting restric-
tions, black voters in 1956 tended to be less active than others (table 2).
Final Estimate of Voting Freedom Rates by State and Racial
Group
The final step was to create a simulation model with 10,000 runs to generate
estimates and confidence intervals for the voting freedom level, U for each racial
group in each state.
The turnout rate for each racial group in each state was sampled from a
triangular distribution with minimum value 0%, maximum value 100%, and
most likely value the average turnout rate for that racial group from table 2.
The relative error in census enumeration was modeled with a triangular
distribution using the calculated percent population as the most likely value
and the Census Bureau’s reported rates of erroneous inclusion (white: 0.8%,
non-white: 1.2%) and omission (white: 2.0%, non-white 4.5%) for the 1950
census as lower and upper bounds, respectively [23, p. 11].
According to Census Bureau publications, the gross error for intercensal
population estimates by racial group was less than 1% through the 1950s. Be-
cause these estimates are an aggregate of many smaller regional census errors
in each state, the population percentage for each racial group is essentially a
mean. Therefore, by the central limit theorem, errors in its estimation can be
expected to be normally distributed. Accordingly, intercensal error in popu-
lation percentages was sampled from a normal distribution with mean=0 and
97.5th percentile=1% [4].
In each trial, for each state (i), the simulation generated turnout rates and
population percentages for each racial group then found values of Uw, Ub, and
Uo to minimize equation 5 for that state.
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Minimize:
Uw,iP
′
w,iT
′
w,i + Ub,iP
′
b,iT
′
b,i + Uo,iP
′
o,iT
′
o,i − Ti (5)
For decision variables:
Uw,i, Ub,i, Uo,i
Where:
P ′w,i =
Pw,i(1 + EE,w,i)(1 + EI,w,i)
Pˆi
P ′b,i =
Pb,i(1 + EE,b,i)(1 + EI,b,i)
Pˆi
P ′o,i =
Po,i(1 + EE,o,i)(1 + EI,o,i)
Pˆi
Pˆi = Pw,i(1 + EE,w,i)(1 + EI,w,i)+
Pb,i(1 + EE,b,i)(1 + EI,b,i)+
Po,i(1 + EE,o,i)(1 + EI,o,i)
EE,w,i = relative enumeration error for whites
∼ Tri(−0.008, 0, 0.02)
EE,b,i = relative enumeration error for blacks
∼ Tri(−0.012, 0, 0.045)
EE,o,i = relative enumeration error for other non-whites
∼ Tri(−0.012, 0, 0.045)
EI,w,i = relative intercensal interpolation error for whites
∼ N(0, 0.005102)
EI,b,i = relative intercensal interpolation error for blacks
∼ N(0, 0.005102)
EI,o,i = relative intercensal interpolation error for other non-whites
∼ N(0, 0.005102)
T ′w,i ∼ Tri(0, Tw,i, 1)
T ′b,i ∼ Tri(0, Tb,i, 1)
T ′o,i ∼ Tri(0, To,i, 1))
The values for Uw, Ub, Uo, and U¯ for each state in each trial were then
tabulated with means and 95 percent confidence intervals calculated. The results
are summarized in table 3 and figure 1.
Calculation of Revised Apportionment
Using the voting freedom rates estimated above, and assuming a literal imple-
mentation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the change in apportion-
ment was then calculated. The “method of equal proportions” was used, as
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it has been the official apportionment method of the House of Representatives
since 1941. Initially, each state is assigned one representative. Then a prior-
ity number is calculated for each state using equation 6 and the next available
representative is assigned to the state with the highest number. The algorithm
iterates until all representatives have been assigned [27, 2].
φi =
U¯iE50,i
mi
√
mi + 1
(6)
Where:
φi = priority number
U¯i = overall voting freedom rate
E50,i = population of state in most recent enumeration
mi = number of representatives already assigned to state
The projected results of reapportionment are shown in table 4.
Simulation of Effects on the Power Balance in Congress
Assuming that this revised apportionment occurred, redistricting would have
been required in all of the affected states. There is no certain way to predict
which representatives would have been elected to congress. However, a rough
estimate of the relative party strengths following the election is possible. Taking
the ratio of Democratic candidates elected in each state to the total number of
seats in that state as a point estimate for the mean proportion of Democrats that
would be elected in that state for any possible districting scheme, it is possible
to approximate the distribution of the number of Democrats elected in a given
state as a binomial distribution (eq. 7). The expected number of Democrats
elected from each state would then be equal to the proportion of Democrats
actually elected in 1958 multiplied by the number of congressional districts.
The expected total number of Democrats elected would have been 255. While
less than the historical number elected, 283, this would still be well over the 217
seats needed for a majority in a 437 seat House. Since the standard standard
deviation of the mean of a proportion is equal to
√
p(1−p)
N , a confidence interval
for the above estimate can be found with a straight-forward simulation that
samples the binomial distribution for each state based on a sampled probability
of election of a Democrat.
Dtotal =
50∑
i=1
Di : Di = Bin
−1(pi, qi, αi) (7)
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Where:
pi ∼ N(x¯i, si)
x¯i = ratio of Democrats elected to total representatives
in state i in 1958 election
si =
√
x¯i(1− x¯i)
qi
qi = number of congressional districts in state i
α ∼ U(0, 1)
Based on this simulation there would only have been a 1.33% probability
(95% CI: [1.04%, 1.63%]) that the Democratic party would have lost their ma-
jority following the 1958 election as a result of reapportionment. The probability
that Republicans could actually have obtained a majority in the House is only
0.20% (95% CI: [0.08%, 0.32%]) (table 5).
Results
Based on this analysis, it seems that a number of states did indeed show signifi-
cant impediments to voting in 1956. Of the twelve states in the first quartile, ten
were former members of the Confederacy. Had Congress, with or without the
urging of Dwight Eisenhower, decided to implement Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy this situation in the 1958 election, it would have caused
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virgina, and Maine to lose represen-
tatives, weakening the Southern voting block in Congress. The states which
would have gained representatives would have been California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. It is highly unlikely that Democrats would
have lost control of the House, but many more house seats would have been
filled with moderate Democrats who would be less likely to oppose civil rights
legislation.
The most significant piece of Civil Rights legislation passed by the 86th
Congress was the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which was essentially a bipartisan
measure. The mostly Democratic Southern voting block fought hard to stall
or derail the act. Of the 109 congressmen voting against the act, 100 of them
were from Southern states, with the contingents from Alabama, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and Arkansas voting against it unanimously. Ul-
timately, however, they could not martial the numbers to stop it. These are
among the states which would have lost the most representatives if 14/2 had
been enforced. Congressman Samuel Stratton of New York, addressing the house
after the bill passed, lamented that it did not go far enough. Whether a reduc-
tion in the numbers of the Southern voting block would actually have allowed
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Stratton and his allies to pass a stronger bill, though, is purely speculative. [24,
pp. 6512-6513].
Southerners in the senate, on the other hand, were able to muster much
stiffer resistance, mounting a filibuster and other maneuvers to stall the bill
for several weeks and managing to weaken the bill with amendments before it
finally passed[24, pp. 7727-7815]. Enforcement of 14/2 would not have had any
effect on the composition of the Senate.
Despite the powerful hold it had on the imagination of Victor Sharrow and
others, Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment probably did not, in itself,
have the power to make a serious difference in the progress of Civil Rights leg-
islation. This may well have been President Eisenhower’s conclusion, assuming
that Sharrow’s presentation materials were actually passed on to him. Even had
enforcement of 14/2 been more likely to have an effect, it is questionable whether
the president would have or could have pushed for it. Biographer Stephen Am-
brose writes that Eisenhower was generally in favor of civil rights, and felt that
the right to vote was one of the most critical parts of the American way of life.
He also worried that the disenfranchisement of black voters negatively affected
the worldwide image of the United States. However, he tended to avoid direct
confrontation with Southern congressmen and seemed to lack a clear vision for
civil rights reform. In the previous congress Republicans members, at Eisen-
hower’s urging, had spent two years passing the Civil Rights Act of 1957. The
final product was a law that the president barely recognized, with such light
penalties and such barriers to enforcement that Eisenhower considered it to
be nearly useless. It seems likely that Eisenhower dismissed Sharrow’s plan to
enforce 14/2 as a political impossibility [1, pp. 406-413,497-499].
Conclusion
It seems that, contrary to the opinion of the Federal courts, there was indeed
enough information publicly available in 1957 to estimate the extent of voting
abridgment in each state with a fair degree of confidence. This implies that
Congress had the prerogative to reapportion representation of those states ac-
cording to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether they had the duty
to do so, and whether the Judiciary branch had the power to require that they do
so are more doubtful. The opinion of the judiciary branch was that 14/2 could
be enforced or not at the pleasure of Congress. In an earlier 14th Amendment
case, United States v Dennis, both the trial and appellate judges quoted the
following passage from David Watson’s The Constitution of the United States:
Its History, Application and Construction [6],
Congress has never exercised the power conferred upon it of re-
ducing the representation of a State in its lower branch, but there
can be no question of its power or its right to do so. Of its duty to do
so, it alone is the judge. The amendment places the responsibility
of enforcing its provisions upon that body [25].
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Given this construction of 14/2, enforcement would require that the major-
ity of representatives in the house would have enough of a vested interest in
enforcing it to risk alienating the entire South. Given that they did not do
so immediately after the civil war, when ill feeling had waxed its highest, it is
unlikely they would have done so in 1958.
Another question is whether the tools existed to analyze the information is
another question. The model presented here relies on nonlinear programming
techniques which are now widely implemented in computer software and rou-
tinely used. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, however, the field was still in its infancy.
While some of the first principles had been touched on as early as 1938 [13] a
workable formulation had not been offered until Kuhn’s and Tucker’s seminal
1950 paper [14]. A reliable software tool was still years in the future.
In 1965 Congress finally acted to ensure voting rights for minorities, but the
vehicle they chose was the Voting Rights Act, rather than Section 2 of the 14th
Amendment. The Jim Crow era ended at last. While 14/2 is still occasion-
ally cited in debates over issues as diverse as term limits [12] and immigration
reform[26], its original purpose–forcing states to enfranchise black citizens–has
been accomplished by other means.
Ultimately, to the disappointment of enthusiasts like Victor Sharrow, 14/2
never played a central role in the civil rights struggle in America. From an
historical point of view, however, the debate over 14/2 enforcement is a fasci-
nating illustration of the changing role of data driven decision making in public
policy. Sharrow and others spent decades writing about 14/2, lobbying for
its enforcement, and arranging for federal court cases to produce a hoped for
supreme court precedent. Repeatedly, they were told that the question was
not justiciable because they were unable to demonstrate a convincing argument
that reapportionment would benefit them. There is no evidence that any of
these activists built a quantitative model like the one described in this paper
to support their case, yet here was sufficient data, the required mathematical
techniques existed, and digital computers, while still slow and expensive, were
commercially available.
Perhaps the entire concept of data driven decision making was simply too
new in the mid 20th century to be a regular part of the thought process for
judges, lawyers, or lobbyists. It took years for computer modeled evidence to
regularly appear in the courtroom. By the mid 1970s numerous articles on the
subject began to appear in law reviews, many of them written by business or
information professionals, rather than lawyers [5][7]. Jenkins, writing in 1976,
pointed out that the admissibility of this evidence was still an emerging area of
law and some judges still regarded the computer as a “new-fangled invention”,
but overall momentum of the profession seemed to be towards greater use of
computer modeling,
Many companies now offer ready-made programs to assist attor-
neys in some or all of the areas suggested. Many universities and
business schools have knowledgeable people who have already de-
veloped programs to do some or all of the things suggested in this
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article. Bar associations around the country are offering informative
seminars relating to the use of computers.
Law schools are beginning to offer courses in quantitative meth-
ods and the law or computers and the law. [11]
By the 1990s, computer models, including sophisticated visual animations,
were widely used by the legal profession and admitted as evidence [17]. Now, in
the 21st century, data driven computer models are ubiquitous in nearly every
aspect of our society. Today, contrast to 1958, developing a computer model
would not only seem like a natural step to a legal activist today, but would
probably be one of the first steps, reflecting the changing role of computer
modeling and data science over the past six decades.
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Estimated Population (1000s)
Other Total Votes Overall Voter
State Total White Black Non-White Cast (1000s) Turnout
AL 3,071 2,086 982 3 426 24.31%
AR 1,704 1,322 381 1 405 40.77%
AZ 1,053 919 36 97 261 42.00%
CA 13,713 12,844 599 271 5,342 57.18%
CO 1,625 1,590 25 10 630 60.82%
CT 2,316 2,253 62 2 1,097 68.76%
DE 408 351 56 1 174 64.31%
FL 4,047 3,163 881 3 989 37.15%
GA 3,701 2,557 1,142 1 656 30.39%
IA 2,703 2,681 20 2 1,269 72.60%
ID 628 620 1 7 276 74.23%
IL 9,530 8,802 707 22 4,481 68.75%
IN 4,458 4,259 197 2 1,955 67.50%
KS 2,119 2,034 81 4 896 64.84%
KY 2,898 2,698 199 1 993 57.90%
LA 3,032 2,030 997 5 652 36.36%
MA 4,891 4,808 76 6 2,383 87.71%
MD 2,811 2,345 463 4 902 49.24%
ME 938 941 1 2 352 59.42%
MI 7,467 6,935 518 14 2,799 58.15%
MN 3,240 3,209 15 16 1,379 66.47%
MO 4,163 3,848 313 2 1,892 68.01%
MS 2,086 1,138 944 4 286 24.69%
MT 656 636 1 20 265 64.13%
NC 4,309 3,165 1,111 33 1,211 49.39%
ND 613 602 0 11 270 74.53%
NE 1,397 1,371 20 5 610 67.26%
NH 566 565 1 0 273 72.86%
NJ 5,615 5,239 370 6 2,420 62.12%
NM 806 746 10 50 239 53.71%
NV 250 234 7 9 82 49.08%
NY 16,112 15,071 998 43 7,128 63.24%
OH 9,207 8,606 594 6 3,701 60.50%
OK 2,273 2,069 148 56 949 67.45%
OR 1,698 1,671 13 14 695 62.15%
PA 10,972 10,299 667 6 4,581 62.64%
RI 840 824 15 1 414 72.62%
SC 2,229 1,362 866 2 341 28.15%
SD 670 645 1 24 294 71.50%
TN 3,415 2,863 551 1 893 43.49%
TX 8,830 7,703 1,119 8 2,076 38.27%
UT 809 795 3 11 330 72.00%
VA 3,722 2,895 823 3 620 27.28%
VT 377 376 0 0 154 64.81%
WA 2,668 2,598 34 36 1,103 63.06%
WI 3,742 3,695 31 15 1,607 66.39%
WV 1,857 1,755 106 0 874 80.52%
WY 312 305 3 4 129 67.51%
Table 1: State populations and voter turnouts in 1956 presidential election.
Voter turnout is the approximate percentage of non-incarcerated persons age 21
or over who voted in the election. Alaska and Hawaii had not yet become states
in 1956.
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Racial Group Mean SE of the Mean 95% CI for Mean
Whites 68.854% 0.017% 68.821% 68.888%
Blacks 35.799% 0.232% 35.345% 36.253%
Other Non-White 59.562% 0.428% 58.724% 60.401%
Table 2: Average Natural Voting Rates by Racial Groups
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Voting Freedom Rate
State Mean SE 95% CI
MS 51.35% 0.21% 50.95% 51.76%
AL 53.06% 0.18% 52.71% 53.41%
VA 55.22% 0.21% 54.80% 55.63%
SC 60.94% 0.18% 60.60% 61.29%
GA 64.06% 0.18% 63.70% 64.42%
TX 73.19% 0.18% 72.83% 73.55%
FL 73.22% 0.18% 72.88% 73.56%
LA 74.13% 0.17% 73.80% 74.46%
AZ 76.88% 0.17% 76.55% 77.21%
AR 78.36% 0.16% 78.04% 78.68%
TN 80.65% 0.16% 80.34% 80.96%
NV 83.73% 0.15% 83.44% 84.02%
NC 83.91% 0.15% 83.62% 84.20%
MD 83.97% 0.15% 83.68% 84.26%
NM 88.39% 0.12% 88.15% 88.62%
CA 91.14% 0.10% 90.94% 91.34%
ME 92.28% 0.10% 92.09% 92.47%
KY 92.30% 0.10% 92.11% 92.49%
MI 92.61% 0.09% 92.43% 92.80%
CO 93.31% 0.09% 93.14% 93.48%
OH 93.72% 0.08% 93.56% 93.89%
OR 93.98% 0.08% 93.82% 94.14%
NJ 94.00% 0.08% 93.84% 94.16%
NY 94.50% 0.08% 94.35% 94.65%
WA 94.82% 0.07% 94.67% 94.96%
PA 94.96% 0.07% 94.82% 95.10%
MT 95.10% 0.07% 94.96% 95.24%
VT 95.23% 0.07% 95.10% 95.37%
KS 95.88% 0.06% 95.76% 96.01%
MN 96.13% 0.06% 96.01% 96.25%
WI 96.19% 0.06% 96.07% 96.31%
IN 96.63% 0.06% 96.53% 96.74%
NE 96.64% 0.06% 96.54% 96.75%
WY 96.85% 0.05% 96.75% 96.96%
IL 97.28% 0.05% 97.18% 97.37%
CT 97.42% 0.05% 97.33% 97.51%
OK 97.59% 0.04% 97.50% 97.67%
MO 97.73% 0.04% 97.64% 97.81%
SD 98.21% 0.03% 98.14% 98.27%
UT 98.29% 0.03% 98.23% 98.36%
IA 98.52% 0.03% 98.46% 98.58%
NH 98.59% 0.03% 98.53% 98.64%
RI 98.61% 0.03% 98.55% 98.66%
ID 98.92% 0.02% 98.87% 98.97%
DE 99.03% 0.03% 98.98% 99.08%
ND 99.11% 0.02% 99.07% 99.15%
WV 99.89% 0.00% 99.88% 99.89%
MA 99.96% 0.00% 99.96% 99.96%
Table 3: Overall Voting Freedom Rates by State, 1956
17
Figure 1: Voting Freedom Rates by State, 1956
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Figure 2: Extent of Voting Rights Infringement by State, 1956
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Apportioned Reps.
Apportioned Reps., if 14th Amendment
State Historical Enforced Change
AL 9 5 -4
AK 1 1 0
AZ 2 2 0
AR 6 4 -2
CA 30 33 3
CO 4 4 0
CT 6 7 1
DE 1 1 0
FL 8 7 -1
GA 10 7 -3
HI 1 1 0
ID 2 2 0
IL 25 29 4
IN 11 12 1
IA 8 8 0
KS 6 6 0
KY 8 8 0
LA 8 6 -2
ME 3 3 0
MD 7 6 -1
MA 14 13 -1
MI 18 19 1
MN 9 9 0
MS 6 3 -3
MO 11 13 2
MT 2 2 0
NE 4 4 0
NV 1 1 0
NH 2 2 0
NJ 14 16 2
NM 2 2 0
NY 43 49 6
NC 12 10 -2
ND 2 2 0
OH 23 25 2
OK 6 7 1
OR 4 5 1
PA 30 34 4
RI 2 3 1
SC 6 4 -2
SD 2 2 0
TN 9 8 -1
TX 22 18 -4
UT 2 2 0
VT 1 1 0
VA 10 6 -4
WA 7 7 0
WV 6 6 0
WI 10 11 1
WY 1 1 0
Table 4: Expected Change in Congressional Apportionment in 1958 had Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment Been Enforced. Based on a 437 seat House of
Representatives. Hawaii and Alaska were assigned one seat each pending the
next enumeration.
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Outcome Probability 95% CI
Democratic majority in the House 98.40% 98.08% 98.72%
No majority for either party 1.33% 1.04% 1.63%
Republican majority in the House 0.27% 0.13% 0.40%
Table 5: Possible outcomes in 1958 congressional election assuming reappor-
tionment. Based on a Monte Carlo simulation with 1500 trials.
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